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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has given its first judgment on the interpretation of
the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 (‘the Rome
Convention’) which is given the force of law by s2 of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act
1990 in the United Kingdom.Although that Convention has been in force since 1 April
1991, the First Protocol of 19 December 1988 on the interpretation of the European
Communities of the Rome Convention did not come into force until 1 August 2004.
Therefore although the ECJ has referred to the Rome Convention when interpreting other
conventions and regulations, this is the first case on the Rome Convention itself.
The irony is that for all contracts concluded after 17 December 2009 a new
regulation, Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (‘Rome I’), will apply in all EC Member States
1
, except Denmark, and
some of the issues referred to the ECJ are answered in Rome I.However,the court’s
judgment in Case C-133/08 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuisen
BV,MIC Operations BV is important for the interpretation of contracts of carriage
of goods concluded up to 17 December 2009 and will also help with some issues of
interpretation of Rome I.
The Rome Convention
Both the Rome Convention and Rome I recognise party autonomy and if the
parties choose the law applicable to their contract, that choice, provided it is clear
enough,will,subject to limited exceptions,be recognised.Where the parties have not
made a choice,art 4(1) provides that the contract will be ‘governed by the law of the
country with which it is most closely connected’. Exceptionally a severable part of
the contract may be governed by a different law if that part ‘has a closer connection
with another country’– the concept of depecage.
In order to determine the country with which the contract is most closely
connected arts 4(2), (3) and (4) provide for presumptions.Art 4(2) would apply to
contracts such as an international sale contract or insurance contract and provides
that a contract is presumed to be most closely connected with the country where
the party who is to effect the characteristic performance of the contract (not usually
payment of the price or premium) has its principal place of business. Art 4(4)
provides for a special presumption to apply to a contract for the carriage of goods.
Single voyage charterparties and other contracts the main purpose of which is the
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Partner, Stephenson Harwoodcarriage of goods (not passengers) shall be treated as such
contracts.In contracts for the carriage of goods,if the country
in which,at the time the contract is concluded,the carrier has
his principal place of business is also the country in which the
place of loading or the place of discharge or the principal place
of business of the consignor is situated,it shall be presumed that
the contract is most closely connected with that country.The
Giuliano-Lagarde  Report
2 states that the carrier’s place of
business is that at the time the contract is concluded (at p22).
Similarly the places of loading and unloading are those agreed
at the time when the contract is concluded and the carrier is
‘the party who undertakes to carry the goods whether or not
he performs the carriage himself’ (ibid).Art 4(5) provides that
the presumptions will not,however,apply if it appears from the
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely
connected with another country.Thus if an Italian charterer
who is also the contracting carrier issues bills of lading for
carriage of goods from Rotterdam to Genoa,the presumption
is that the law applicable is Italian unless it appears from the
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely
connected with another country.
This note will consider the decision in Interfrigo which
concerns whether the presumption in art 4(4) of the Rome
Convention applies to a contract for the carriage of goods
where the parties have not made any choice of law. It will
further consider the changes made by Rome I to this
presumption.
The facts
In Interfrigo ICF, a company established in Belgium, entered
into a charterparty with Balkenende and MIC, both
established in the Netherlands,in the context of a project for
a train connection for freight traffic between Amsterdam in
the Netherlands and Frankfurt am Main in Germany.Under
the charterparty ICF undertook, inter alia, to make train
wagons available to MIC and ensure their transport via the
rail network.MIC was responsible for all operational aspects
of the transport of the goods concerned and had hired out
the acquired load capacity to third parties. ICF brought
proceedings in the Netherlands against Balkenende and MIC
for unpaid invoices and the defendants argued that the claim
was time barred under the law applicable to their contract
with ICF ie the law of the Netherlands.ICF argued that the
law of Belgium applied as the contract was not a contract of
carriage within art 4(4) and therefore the law should be
determined on the basis of art 4(2) according to which the
law applicable to the contract was that of the country in
which ICF’s principal place of business was situated. In that
event the claim was not yet time barred.
The first issue that the European Court had to consider
was whether art 4(4) only applies to voyage charterparties
and whether other forms of charterparty fall outside its
scope. After considering the Giuliano-Lagarde  Report, the
ECJ considered the submission of the Czech Government
that the last sentence of art 4(4) ‘is intended to extend the
scope of art 4(4) to certain categories of contracts connected
with the carriage of goods although those contracts cannot
be categorised as contract of carriage of goods’. In contrast
the Commission of the European Communities argued for a
restrictive interpretation that art 4(4) only applies to ‘certain
categories of charter-parties,namely those by which a means
of transport is made available by a carrier on a single
occasion and those entered into by a carrier and a consignor
which relate exclusively to the carriage of goods’.The ECJ
accepted the wider interpretation and held that art 4(4)
applies to a charterparty other than a single voyage
charterparty,only where the main purpose of the contract is
not merely to make available a means of transport, but the
actual carriage of goods.
The second issue the Court had to consider was the
position where a contract may be severable: when may
different laws apply to the same contract, in particular as to
time limits? If the contract is mainly for the purpose of
carriage of goods within art 4(4), does it come entirely
within the scope of art 4(4) or by contrast does the
presumption in art 4(4) only apply to the aspects of the
contract relating to the carriage of goods and the rest of the
contract is governed by art 4(2)? If the contract does not
concern mainly the carriage of goods is it completely
excluded from the scope of art 4(4)? The Commission
argued that if the contract fell within art 4(4) there would be
no need to sever it and the right to payment for the
performance of the contract and the issue of the time bar
were ‘connected so closely with the principal contract that it
is not possible to separate them without infringing the
principle of legal certainty’.
The Court held that in the interests of legal certainty
different laws could only be applicable to different parts of
the same contract where a number of parts of the contract
could ‘be regarded as independent of each other’.Thus a part
of a contract may only be governed by a law other than that
applied to the rest of the contract where the object of that
part is independent.Where the presumption is that set out in
art 4(4), that criterion must be applied to the whole of the
charter, unless the part of the contract relating to carriage is
independent of the rest of the contract.
Lastly the court had to consider when the presumptions in
art 4(2), (3) and (4) may be disregarded.This issue has been
considered in the English case law
3.Can they be disregarded
only if it is evident from the circumstances in their totality
that the presumptions do not have ‘any genuine connecting
value’? Alternatively can the court also refrain from applying
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2them if it is clear from those circumstances that there is a
stronger connection with some other country? Again the
court stressed the need for legal certainty counterbalanced
with some flexibility. Therefore it is always necessary to
determine the applicable law on the basis of the presumptions
and it is only where it is clear from the circumstances as a
whole that the contract is more closely connected with a
country other than that identified by applying the
presumptions,that the court may disregard the presumptions.
Rome I
Rome I has a new art 5 which deals with the presumption
where there is no choice in a contract for the carriage of
goods by sea and passengers. Recital 22 of Rome I gives
contracts for the carriage of goods the same definition as art
4(4) of the Rome Convention and therefore Interfrigo is
equally applicable to determine which contracts the
presumption applies to.Art 5(1) provides that the law of the
country of the habitual residence of the carrier shall be
applicable,provided that that is also the place of receipt or the
place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor.If
those conditions are not satisfied, the law of the country
where the parties agreed the goods would be delivered
applies. Pursuant to art 5(3) where it is clear from all the
circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in
art 5(1), the law of that other country shall apply. This
wording is clearer than the wording in art 4(5) of the Rome
Convention and already seems to provide for the solution
which the ECJ reached on the final issue in Interfrigo.
Habitual residence is helpfully defined in art 19 of Rome
I.For a company it is the place of central administration (art
19(1)).Art 19(2) clarifies the position where the contract is
concluded in the course of operation of a branch,agency or
any other establishment.The relevant time for determining
the habitual residence is when the contract is concluded (art
19(3)).Recital 22 provides that the term ‘consignor’refers to
any person who enters into a contract of carriage.The term
‘carrier’ refers to the party who undertakes to carry the
goods, whether or not it performs the carriage itself ie the
contractual carrier and not the actual carrier.
Endnotes
1.The United Kingdom opted in to Rome I. See Consultation Paper
CP05/08 (Rome I- Should the UK Opt In?) published on 2 April 2008
which recommended that the United Kingdom should seek the agree-
ment of the European Commission to opt in to Rome I and apply
equivalent rules between UK jurisdictions, and is currently 
consulting on that recommendation. It was produced by the Ministry
of Justice and the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and
Personnel and the Scottish Government with the assistance of HM
Treasury, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform and the Department for Transport. See the Ministry of Justice
website at www.justice.gov.uk. The consultation ended on 25 June
2008. See the Commission’s Opinion accepting the United Kingdom’s
request to accept Rome I Brussels 7.11.2008 COM (2008) 730 final.
2 The report on the Rome Convention by Professor Mario Giuliano and
Professor Paul Lagarde may be considered in ascertaining the meaning
or effect of any provision of the Rome Convention. O.C.J. 31.10.1980.
3 See eg Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd v Marek Lieberberg
Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 455; Iran Continental
Shelf Oil Co. v IRI International Corp [2004] 2 CLC 696; Samcrete
Egypt Engineers and Contractors SAE v Land Rover Exports Ltd
[2002] CLC 533; Ennstone Building Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002]
2 All ER (Comm) 479 applied in Waldwiese Stiftung v Lewis [2004]
EWHC 2589 (Ch); Kenburn Waste Management Ltd v Bergmann
[2002] CLC 644; Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Micoperi SRL [2003] SC 70
Inner House Court of Session; Ophthalmic Innovations International
(UK) Ltd v Ophthalmic Innovations International Incorporated [2004]
EWHC 2948 (Ch).
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Review of the Brussels I Regulation
Almost four months after the deadline of 30 June 2009, preceding
which the European Commission launched a broad consultation
among interested parties on possible ways to improve the operation
of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (OJ 2001 L 12/1), the member states of the European
Union await the results with baited breath.
After the comparative survey of the Regulation,which resulted
in the Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation
Brussels I in the member states (Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, Study
JLS/C4/2005/03), the European Commission issued a Green
Paper on the review of the Regulation (COM (2009) 175 final,
Brussels,21 April 2009),accompanied by a Report on the same
Regulation’s application (COM (2009) 174 final, Brussels, 21
April 2009).The suggestions given in relation to the interface
between arbitration and the Regulation are particularly
important for the London market,given the recent decision of
the European Court of Justice in Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione
Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) v West Tankers Inc (C-185/07) [2009] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 413, where it was held that the use of an 
anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in the court of
another member state,even where those proceedings have been
commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement, is